cleverhans is a software library that provides standardized reference implementations of adversarial example construction techniques and adversarial training. The library may be used to develop more robust machine learning models and to provide standardized benchmarks of models' performance in the adversarial setting. Benchmarks constructed without a standardized implementation of adversarial example construction are not comparable to each other, because a good result may indicate a robust model or it may merely indicate a weak implementation of the adversarial example construction procedure.
Introduction
Adversarial examples are inputs crafted by making slight perturbations to legitimate inputs with the intent of misleading machine learning models [6] . The perturbations are designed to be small in magnitude, such that a human observer would not have difficulty processing the resulting input. In many cases, the perturbation required to deceive a machine learning model is so small that a human being may not be able to perceive that anything has changed, or even so small that an 8-bit representation of the input values does not capture the perturbation used to fool a model that accepts 32-bit inputs. We invite readers unfamiliar with the concept to the detailed presentation in [6, 4, 5, 2] . Although completely effective defenses have yet to be proposed, the most successful to date is adversarial training [6, 4] .
The cleverhans library provides reference implementations of the attacks, which are intended for use for two purposes. First, machine learning developers may construct robust models by using adversarial training, which requires the construction of adversarial examples during the training procedure. Second, we encourage researchers who report the accuracy of their models in the adversarial setting to use the standardized reference implementation provided by cleverhans. Without a standard reference implementation, different benchmarks are not comparable-a benchmark reporting high accuracy might indicate a more robust model, but it might also indicate the use of a weaker attack implementation. By using cleverhans, researchers can be assured that a high accuracy on a benchmark corresponds to a robust model.
Implemented in Python, cleverhans is designed as a tool complementing existing numerical computation libraries like TensorFlow [1] and Theano [7] , as well as specialized higher-level machine learning libraries like Keras [3] that help developers to quickly implement models using predefined layers.
The cleverhans library is a collaboration between OpenAI and the Pennsylvania State University. It is free, open-source software, licensed under the MIT license. The project is available online through GitHub 1 . The main communication channel for developers of the library is a mailing list, whose discussions are publicly available online 2 .
Core functionalities
The library's package is organized by modules. The most important modules are:
• attacks: contains the implementations of adversarial example crafting algorithms
• utils tf: contains helper functions to train and evaluate models using TensorFlow. This module also includes the implementation of adversarial training, a defense to make models more robust to adversarial examples.
In the following, we describe some of the research results behind the implementations made in cleverhans.
Attacks
Adversarial example crafting algorithms implemented in cleverhans take a model, and an input, and return the corresponding adversarial example. Here are the algorithms currently implemented in the attacks module.
Fast Gradient Sign Method
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) was introduced by Goodfellow et al. [4] . The intuition behind the attack is to linearize the cost function J used to train a model f around the neighborhood of the training point x that the adversary wants to force the misclassification of. The resulting adversarial example x * corresponding to input x is computed as follows:
where ε is a parameter controlling the magnitude of the perturbation introduced.
Larger values increase the likelihood that x * will be misclassified by f , but make the perturbation easier to detect by a human.
The fast gradient sign method is available by calling attacks.fgsm() The implementation defines the necessary graph elements and returns a tensor, which once evaluated holds the value of the adversarial example corresponding to the input provided. The implementation is parameterized by the parameter ε introduced above. It is possible to configure the method to clip adversarial examples so that they are constrained to be part of the expected input domain range.
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach
The Jacobian-based saliency map approach (JSMA) was introduced by Papernot et al. [5] . The method iteratively perturbs features of the input that have large adversarial saliency scores. Intuitively, this score reflects the adversarial goal of taking a sample away from its source class towards a chosen target class.
First, the adversary computes the Jacobian of the model and evaluates it in the current input: this returns a matrix
is the derivative of class j with respect to input feature i. To compute the adversarial saliency map, the adversary then computes the following for each input feature i:
where t is the target class that the adversary wants the machine learning model to assign. The adversary then selects the input feature i with the largest saliency score S( x, t)[i] and increases its value 3 . The process is repeated until misclas-sification in the target class is achieved or the maximum number of perturbed features has been reached. In cleverhans, the Jacobian-based saliency map approach may be called with attacks.jsma(). The implementation returns the adversarial example directly, as well as whether the target class was achieved or not, and how many input features were perturbed.
Defenses
The intuition behind defenses against adversarial examples is to make the model smoother by limiting its sensitivity to small perturbations of its inputs (and therefore making adversarial examples harder to craft). Since all defenses currently proposed modify the learning algorithm used to train the model, we implement them in the modules of cleverhans that contain the functions used to train models. In module utils tf, the following defenses are implemented.
Adversarial training
The intuition behind adversarial training [6, 4] is to inject adversarial examples during training to improve the generalization of the machine learning model. To achieve this effect, the training function tf model train() implemented in module utils tf can be given the tensor definition for an adversarial example: e.g., the one returned by the method described in Section 2.1.1. When such a tensor is given, the training algorithm modifies the loss function used to optimize the model parameters: it is in that case defined as the average between the loss for predictions on legitimate inputs and the loss for predictions made on adversarial examples. The remainder of the training algorithm is left unchanged.
Reporting Benchmark Results
This section provides instructions for how to preprare and report benchmark results.
When comparing against previously published benchmarks, it is best to to use the same version of cleverhans as was used to produce the previous benchmarks. This minimizes the possibility that an undetected change in behavior between versions could cause a difference in the output of the benchmark results.
When reporting new results that are not directly compared to previous work, it is best to use the most recent versioned release of cleverhans.
In all cases, it is important to report the version number of cleverhans. In addition to this information, one should also report which attack methods were used, and the values of any configuration parameters used for these attacks.
For example, you might report "We benchmarked the robustness of our method to adversarial attack using v1.0.0 of cleverhans (Goodfellow et al. 2016). On a test set modified by fgsm with eps of 0.3, we obtained a test set accuracy of 71.3%."
The library does not provide specific test datasets or data preprocessing. End users are responsible for appropriately preparing the data in their specific application areas, and for reporting sufficient information about the data preprocessing and model family to make benchmarks appropriately comparable.
Versioning
Because one of the goals of cleverhans is to provide a basis for reproducible benchmarks, it is important that the version numbers provide useful information. The library uses semantic versioning, 4 meaning that version numbers take the form of MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.
The PATCH number increments whenever backwards-compatible bug fixes are made. For the purpose of this library, a bug is not considered backwardscompatible if it changes the results of a benchmark test. The MINOR number increments whenever new features are added in a backwards-compatible manner. The MAJOR number increments whenever an interface changes.
As of this writing, no bug affecting the accuracy of a performance number used for a benchmark has ever been discovered. If one is discovered in the future, fixing this bug would cause the MAJOR number to increment, because it is considered a change in the interface mapping from the specification of a benchmark to the reported performance. Release notes accompanying each revision will indicate whether an increment to the MAJOR number invalidates earlier benchmark results or not. • Added jsma , the saliency map attack
Version notes
• Improved the MNIST model in the tutorial, for greater speed and accuracy
The major version number has incremented due to bug fixes that affect the reproducibility of benchmarks:
• Fixed a bug in tf model loss that reduced the effectiveness of both model training and adversarial example construction.
• Fixed a bug in tf model eval that could result in overestimating the accuracy.
For this reason, any benchmarks collected using v0.1 should be replaced using benchmarks collected using v1.0.0.
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